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Foreword

The Public Oversight Board is pleased to
report in this, its eleventh annual report,
that the SEC Practice Section's programs
are sound, rigorously applied, and continue
to enhance the quality of audit practice of
member firms. During the year ended June
3 0 , 1989, the Board gathered considerable
evidence to support such conclusions: one
or more Board members accompanied by
staff attended every meeting of the Sec
tion's three major committees, and the
Board held a joint meeting with the Quality
Control Inquiry Committee; on other occa
sions, it met with representatives of the
Peer Review Committee and Executive
Committee; its staff carefully reviewed
every peer review performed and the work
of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee
task forces; and the Board considered
the reports of its staff concerning these
activities.
The attendance of Board members at
Section committee meetings produces
several benefits. It makes committee mem
bers acutely aware of the Board's interest
in their activities and allows committee
members to hear directly from Board mem
bers their views on matters concerning the
public interest. Board members observe
firsthand the efforts put forth by member
firm representatives in developing and
operating the Section's programs. This
active oversight provides a broad base of
information and experience, which the
Board uses to offer advice and suggestions,
to criticize when necessary, to compliment
when appropriate, and to judge whether
the program serves the public interest.

Board members also participated in a
number of activities relating to the account
ing profession at large. POB Chairman A l
Sommer met with the AICPA Board of
Directors and addressed the Spring Meet
ing of AICPA Council. The full Board met
with the chairman and key staff officers of
the Institute and with representatives of
various organizations interested in the
accounting profession's self-regulatory
program.
We conducted four of our nine meet
ings outside New York City in order to meet
with practitioners, regulators, and legisla
tors on matters relating to the self-regula
tory program and the profession in general.
Our goals in these meetings are to make
the SECPS program better known, to
explain our role and responsibilities, and,
most importantly, to be apprised of the
views and concerns of those interested in
the program. We were pleased with the
responsiveness of those who participated
in our first "Outreach Program"—a round
table discussion with the managing part
ners of local firms headquartered in Minne
apolis and St. Paul and representatives of
the Minnesota Society of CPAs and of the
Minnesota State Board of Accountancy. We
held a similar session in June with the man
aging partners of seven large local firms
headquartered in New York City. We plan to
hold two or three such meetings annually
in various cities throughout the country.
Managing partners at both meetings
expressed satisfaction with the self-regula
tory process and view the peer review pro
gram as being both essential and valuable
to them in monitoring and improving the
quality of their firms' accounting and
auditing practices.
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Some participants at both meetings
expressed concerns that "professionalism"
among members of the profession is de
clining and that auditors were being consid
ered less and less as professionals by out
siders. Opinions were expressed that audit
services are no longer considered the pri
mary service offered by some CPA firms.
Participants indicated that some firms ap
pear to be performing audits for fees that
do not cover variable costs. In an editorial*
Vice Chairman Bob Mautz has called atten
tion to two contrasting concepts of profes
sionalism, and has raised questions regard
ing the ultimate effect of forces impinging
on public accounting and whether public
accounting can survive as a traditional pro
fession. These and other trends impacting
auditing have long-term negative implica
tions which the accounting profession must
guard against. See page 22 for additional
commentary.
During the current year, the Board
established The John J. McCloy Award for
Outstanding Contributions to Audit Excel
lence. Details of the first presentations of
the award are noted on page 10.

*Mautz, Robert K., "Public Accounting: Which Kind of
Professionalism?" Accounting Horizons, September
1988.

John Abernathy of BDO Seidman and
David Pearson of Arthur Young & Company
have completed their third and final years
as chairmen of the SECPS Executive Com
mittee and Peer Review Committee, respec
tively. It would be remiss on our part if we
did not acknowledge the effective and vigi
lant manner in which they have discharged
their leadership responsibilities in maintain
ing and enhancing the high standards of
their predecessors.
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Report o f
The Public
Oversight Board

We are pleased to report that during the year ended June 3 0 , 1989, the Public
Oversight Board implemented its mandate, as described in the Organizational Structure
and Functions Document of the SEC Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, by conducting a comprehensive
program of oversight of the activities of the Section.
In carrying out our responsibilities to represent the public interest in the Section's
self-regulatory program, members of the Board and staff attended and participated in all
meetings of the Executive, Peer Review, and Quality Control Inquiry Committees of the
Section during the year.
We reviewed all revisions to the standards for performing and reporting on peer
reviews and the materials developed to train those who conduct such reviews. We also
tested compliance with those standards through application of our visitation, workpaper,
and report review programs on all peer reviews performed in 1988.
We reviewed the operation of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee to ascertain
whether its activities are conducted with the public interest as their primary objective.
We monitored the committee's analysis of and inquiries into all cases reported by mem
ber firms by, among other means, attending a majority of its task force meetings with
firms at which inquiry was made concerning the quality control implications of cases.
We also performed on-site oversight on all special reviews conducted during the year.
We monitored the follow-up actions taken by the Peer Review and Quality Control
Inquiry Committees to assure that member firms take the required corrective actions to
eliminate quality control deficiencies noted by peer review and special review teams.
We monitored and evaluated the activities of the Executive Committee and its
Planning Subcommittee, the adequacy of membership requirements, and the appoint
ments to the Section's committees and task forces.
In our opinion, the programs of the SEC Practice Section are suitably comprehen
sive and operating in a manner that reasonably assures a high quality of accounting and
auditing practice by its member firms. Nevertheless, as commented on in the discussion
section that follows, we noted areas in which the Section's programs can be improved or
operated more effectively. Consistent with our charge, such matters have been communi
cated to officials of the Section.

June 30, 1989

ROBERT F. FROEHLKE
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Discussion
o f Board
Activities*

to June 30, 1989

The Board monitors and evaluates the
activities of the SEC Practice Section and
makes recommendations for improving the
operation and the effectiveness of the Sec
tion's programs. The Board is autonomous
and consists of five members representing
a broad spectrum of business, professional,
regulatory and legislative experience. To
assure its independence and objectivity, the
Board appoints its own members, chair
man, and staff, and establishes its own
compensation and operating procedures.
The primary responsibility of the Board
is to assure that the public interest is care
fully considered when the Section sets,
revises, and enforces standards, member
ship requirements, rules, and procedures.
The Board, assisted by legal counsel, a staff
of four CPAs, and two administrative assis
tants, discharges its responsibilities through
application of appropriate oversight pro
cedures to all phases of the Section's
activities.
It should be noted that we believe our
charge from the profession includes con
cern for how the profession is perceived.
Accordingly, in this report, we call attention
to some actions and trends that cause us
concern, in some measures because of the
perceptions they create.
Scope o f Board Oversight. While
the Board has no formal jurisdiction beyond
monitoring the activities of the Section, it
has interpreted its mission to include
speaking out on issues affecting the credi
bility of the independent auditor's report
and the role and responsibility of the audi
tor. Accordingly, the Board has established
strong liaison relationships with all compo
nents of the profession and also with the
Commissioners, Chief Accountant, and
staff of the SEC, and with the ComptrollerGeneral of the U.S. Both the SEC and the

*Continuing the practice started last year, the SEC
Practice Section is issuing a report on its operations and
the results o f its peer review, quality control inquiry, and
other activities. This eleventh annual report of the Board
should be read in conjunction with the Section's 198889 annual report.

GAO are vitally interested in the CPA pro
fession and the effectiveness of its selfregulatory program. We monitor all com
ments, reports, and proposals these
agencies issue that affect the profession
and the role and responsibility of the audi
tor in the financial reporting process.
During the year, the Board spoke out
on several issues which it deemed within
its scope of oversight, although the resolu
tion of such issues could come only from
outside the Section.
M andatory Peer Review. The Board
strongly believes that every firm should
undergo peer review and one that audits
public companies should undergo peer
review as a member of the SEC Practice
Section. Peer review is an effective means
of assuring the public that a firm has per
formed its accounting and auditing engage
ments at a satisfactory level of professional
achievement; membership in the Section
identifies a firm dedicated to providing high
quality accounting and auditing services.
Under a current SEC proposal, the
Commission (a) would set peer review
standards, and (b) require a firm that audits
SEC registrants to belong to a peer review
organization acceptable to the Commission
and to undergo either periodic peer reviews
as rigorous as those of the SEC Practice
Section or peer reviews conducted by
the SEC. While we favor mandatory peer
review, we believe the public interest is
best served when peer review standards
are set in and peer reviews are conducted
by the private sector. See page 21 for addi
tional commentary.
Independence Rules. At our
request, during the year the Section's Peer
Review Committee referred three matters
to the AlCPA's Professional Ethics Execu
tive Committee for its consideration and
resolution. These matters involved appar
ent misinterpretation by three different
firms of the ethical rules regarding auditor
independence.
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During the year, we learned that the
Chief Accountant of the SEC had been
asked to issue a modification of the Com
mission's independence rule so that an
audit firm would not be deemed to have
impaired its independence by performing
services in a prime-subcontractor relation
ship with an audit client for a third party, if
the fees received for such services were
immaterial in amount. Because of the pos
sible impact such relationships could have
on auditor independence and public per
ception of auditor independence, the Board
urged the Commission to seek public com
ment on the request.
Role and Responsibility o f the
Auditor. During the year, the Board asked
the Section to bring to the Auditing Stan
dards Board's attention a matter which
surfaced during the course of our oversight
of the quality control inquiry process. As a
result, the Auditing Standards Board placed
on its agenda a project to determine the
degree of understanding an auditor, in the
absence of an audit base, should have of an
entity's control structure in order to issue a
review report on the entity's interim finan
cial statements, particularly when the review
report is to be included in a prospectus.
The Board has proposed a liaison rela
tionship with the recently restructured Plan
ning Committee of the Auditing Standards
Board which includes three members not
currently in public practice. This direct com
munications link will facilitate Board input
into the standard-setting process.
Proposed M anagem ent Report on
Internal Control and Auditor Associa
tion w ith Such Report. The SEC has
issued for public comment a proposal that
management issue a report on its internal
control system, including an assessment of
that system's effectiveness. The Board
wrote the SEC in support of such proposal,
but noted that it should not be adopted
until the Auditing Standards Board had
decided what an auditor must do in order

to comment on management's assertions
when the auditor had not been engaged to
examine and issue a report on internal con
trols. In addition, the Board agrees with the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission that adoption of
the proposal should be delayed until criteria
for management's use in evaluating the
adequacy of a company's internal controls
had been identified and agreed on by all
concerned parties. That committee has
been the catalyst for a research effort to
develop such criteria.
Increased Board Visibility. The
Board, ever mindful that the profession's
self-regulatory activities are virtually
unknown by the financial and business
communities and, for that matter, not suffi
ciently well-known within the accounting
profession, has endeavored to inform mem
bers of the profession and the business and
financial communities about the Section's
programs and the Board's role therein. The
calendar on pages 24-25 summarizes the
Board's extensive involvement in the selfregulatory process.
During the year, the Board conducted
two "outreach programs"—one in Minne
apolis/St. Paul and the other in New York
City—during which the Board had round
table discussions with management repre

AICPA Special Assistant to the
Chairman B. Z. Lee and Vice
President-Federal Government
Relations Joe Moraglio with
POB Vice Chairman Bob
Mautz and POB sta ff members
Lou Matusiak and Chuck Evers
at the POB's January 10, 1989
meeting.
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sentatives of local firms headquartered in
those areas. Representatives of the Minne
sota Society of CPAs and the Minnesota
State Board of Accountancy also attended
the Minneapolis meeting. Reactions to both
meetings were very positive. The Board
heard the concerns of local practitioners on

a wide range of topics, including their per
ceptions of professionalism, the difficulty
that smaller firms have in complying with
certain Section membership requirements,
and the lack of recognition within the busi
ness and financial communities of the sig
nificance of membership in the Section.

Outreach M eeting in N ew York

The meeting was attended by representatives o f seven large local firms headquartered in New York City.
(Left to right) Phil Zimmerman,
POB Chairman A l Sommer, POB
Technical Director Chuck Evers,
POB Vice Chairman Bob Mautz,
POB Executive Director
Lou Matusiak, Gerry Golub,
Eli Hoffman of Richard A. Eisner
& Co., and Gerald Marsden
of Eisner & Lubin.

POB member Bob Froehlke and Norman
Lipshie of Weber, Lipshie & Co.

Gerald Golub of Goldstein, Golub, Kessler & Company and Philip
Zimmerman of Paneth, Haber & Zimmerman with POB member
Paul McCracken.

(Left to right) Jerry Sullivan (appointed POB Executive Director effective October 1, 1989), POB member M el Laird, Kenneth
Weiser of M. R. Weiser & Co., A l Sommer, Paul McCracken, and Phil Zimmerman. Roger Donohue of Edward Isaacs & Co. also
attended the meeting.
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Outreach M eeting in Minneapolis-St. Paul

The meeting was attended by the managing partners o f six CPA firms headquartered in Minneapolis-St. Paul
and representatives o f the Minnesota State Board o f Accountancy and the Minnesota Society o f CPAs.

POB members Bob Froehlke and M el Laird and Minnesota
State Board of Accountancy Executive Secretary Pam Smith.

POB Technical Director Chuck Evers and POB Assistant Technical
Director John Cullen.

Dave Nelson of McGladrey & Pullen and POB Chairman A l Sommer.

Pam Smith and
Minnesota State
Board o f Accoun
tancy Chairman
Michael Vekich.

Richard Hansen of Hansen, Jergensen & Co. and Dennis Peterson of
Bouiay Heutmaker, Zibell & Co.
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The Board intends to hold at least two such
meetings annually in various cities across
the country to gain continuing insight into
the problems and concerns of practitioners,
and to use such input in improving the
operations of the Board and the Section.
The John J. McCloy Award. This
award, named in honor of the Board's first
chairman, who was an outstanding states
man and public servant extraordinaire, hon
ors persons who have served the public
and the profession by making outstanding
contributions to audit excellence. At the
Annual AICPA National Conference on SEC

Developments in January 1989, the Board
presented John J. McCloy Awards to two
practitioners who gave unstintingly of their
time and talents as chairmen of the initial
Peer Review Committees of the SEC Prac
tice Section and Private Companies Prac
tice Section: Donald L. Neebes of Ernst &
Whinney and James P. Luton, Jr., a sole
practitioner in Oklahoma City. The Board's
choices of these CPAs as initial recipients
for the award were widely applauded. The
Board intends to present this award annu
ally to persons selected for their meritori
ous contributions to audit excellence.
POB Vice Chairman
Bob Mautz and POB
Chairman A l Sommer
with the first recipi
ents of The John J.
McCloy Award for
Outstanding Contribu
tions to Audit Excel
lence, James P.
Luton, Jr. of Luton &
Company in Okla
homa City and Donald
L. Neebes of Ernst &
Whinney.
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Oversight
o f the
Peer Review
Process

The Board's most significant charter
responsibility is to monitor and evaluate
the effectiveness of the Section's peer
review process. Peer review is the keystone
of the profession's self-regulatory effort.
Member firms participate to assure them
selves and the public that they are deliver
ing high quality professional auditing and
accounting services.
The Peer Review Committee estab
lishes and enforces peer review standards
and administers the peer review program.
It also obtains sufficient evidence to assure
itself that member firms have adequate
quality control policies and procedures, are
in compliance with them, and are taking
corrective actions to remedy any deficien
cies noted. The Board uses a wide-ranging
"hands-on" oversight program to ensure
that the committee discharges these
responsibilities in the best interests of
the public.
Types o f Oversight Programs. The
Board's monitoring procedures include staff
review of each peer review administered
by the Section, using one of three oversight
programs. The programs vary in intensity.
All test the review team's application of the
peer review performance and reporting
standards.
The type of oversight program applied
to a given review is based upon attributes
of the firm to be reviewed and of the
review team. The attributes given the
most consideration are:
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The POB uses three oversight pro
grams with varying degrees of attention to
the review team's performance, its evalua
tion of the firm's quality control system,
and its reporting of results obtained
therefrom.
■ Visitation and W orkpaper Review.
This includes "on-site" observation of the
review of one or more operating offices,
attendance at the final exit conference,
and review of all the review team's
workpapers, the peer review report, the
letter of comments, and the firm's response.
During the 1988 review year, the Board's
staff, at times accompanied by a Board
member, attended 49 operating office
and final exit conferences held in conjunc
tion with the reviews of 42 firms. The
visitation and workpaper review program
was applied, as has been past practice, to
all reviews of firms with five or more SEC
clients and to reviews of other firms on a
stratified random sample basis.
■ W orkpaper Review. This includes a
comprehensive review of all the review
team's workpapers, the report, the
letter of comments, and the firm's response.
During the 1988 review year, the Board's
staff applied this program to the reviews
of 41 firms, including, as in the past, the
reviews of all firms with less than five
SEC clients that were not randomly
selected for the visitation program, and a
stratified random sample of reviews of
firms with no SEC clients.

■ Firm to be reviewed:
Number o f SEC audit clients
Type o f report issued on the firm's prior review
Number o f professional staff
Number and types o f auditing and accounting
engagements
Type o f POB oversight program used on prior
review

■ Review Team:
Evaluation o f performance on prior reviews
Experience in relation to the nature, size, and
complexity o f the practice o f the
reviewed firm.

■ Report Review. This includes a staff
review of selected portions of the review
team's workpapers, peer review report,
letter of comments, and the firm's
response. It is applied to all peer reviews
not subjected to the above programs. If
such review indicates a possible misappli
cation of peer review standards, the
scope of Board oversight is extended to
the review of all the review team's
workpapers. The report review program
was applied to 29 of the 112 reviews
performed in 1988.
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Scope o f POB Oversight
o f 1988 Peer Reviews
Classified by Number of
SEC Registrants Audited
by Reviewed Firm

Observe Peer Review
in Progress and
Attend
Exit Conference

And

Review of
Peer Review Reports
and Selected
Workpapers

Review of All
Peer Review Team's
Workpapers

Review o
l
fA
Peer Review Team's
Workpapers

Review of
Peer Review Reports

Review of
Peer Review Reports

11 Firms with
5 or more SEC Clients

29 Firms with no
SEC Clients

20 Firms with
1 to 4 SEC Clients

16 Firms with
1 to 4 SEC Clients

21 Firms with
no SEC Clients

15 Firms with
no SEC Clients

Evaluation o f Individual Peer
Review Reports. The Board closely
monitors the adherence to standards
by peer review teams and by the Peer
Review Committee.
Prior to each Peer Review Committee
meeting, the Board's staff meets with the
committee's staff and a subcommittee of

three committee members to discuss
results of individual reviews and the reports
to be considered for acceptance at the fol
lowing committee meeting. The group
identifies issues to be brought to the atten
tion of the committee in the report-accept
ance process. Questions asked include:
Was the review effective? Are the report
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and letter of comments appropriately candid
and complete? Has the firm taken or com
mitted to take appropriate corrective
actions? Should the firm be required to
provide evidence that such action was
taken? Many of these questions are
addressed prior to the meeting so that the
committee's chairman and staff may be
early apprised of serious questions and
concerns raised by the POB staff during the
course of applying the POB oversight pro
grams. In every instance, the committee
has satisfactorily responded to staff ques
tions and concerns.
During the year, Board and staff mem
bers attended all meetings of the commit
tee and participated in the discussions of
the performance of review teams and the
evaluations of individual review reports
whenever appropriate to do so.
The high level and frequency of com
munication between the committee's chair
man and staff and the Board's staff is in
large measure responsible for the satisfac
tory and timely resolution of any and all
questions that have arisen. The Board com
mends the committee members for
their commitment and dedication to the
program.
Timely Processing o f Reviews.
Policy requires that a review team issue its
report to the reviewed firm no later than
thirty days after the exit conference. The
reviewed firm must respond by letter and
identify the actions it plans to take with
respect to every deficiency noted in the
review team's letter of comments. That
letter, the peer review report, and the letter
of comments are required to be submitted
to the committee no later than thirty days
after the receipt of the review team's report
and letter of comments. The majority of
review teams and reviewed firms complied
with these time requirements. By June 30,
1989, all reports on the 112 peer reviews
performed in 1988 had been processed by
the committee.
The committee's vigorous pursuit
of late filings, often through the personal

involvement of the chairman, is the primary
reason why all the peer review reports for
reviews performed in 1988 were processed
by the committee on or before June 30,
1989. The Board commends the committee
for expediting the processing of reports,
thus decreasing the length of time between
the discovery of a deficiency in a firm's
quality control system and assurance to the
committee that the firm has taken appropri
ate corrective action.
M onitoring Committee Follow-up
Actions. The committee requires a firm
with serious deficiencies in the design of its
quality control system, or pervasive noncompliance with important quality control
policies and procedures, to demonstrate
that it has taken corrective measures.
Sometimes the committee even specifies
actions that the firm must take.
The Board monitors committee follow
up actions and, by so doing, is made aware
of the quality control improvements
effected. Follow-up actions are not limited
to ensuring that firms implement appropri
ate corrective actions. The committee is
just as rigorous in evaluating the perfor
mance of the review team captain and
members, and culling out from its "re
viewer bank" those whose work is deemed
to be substandard.
Peer Review Standards. The
standards for conducting peer reviews and
reporting their results are continuously
reevaluated to assure that peer review is a
probing process sufficiently recognizing the
dynamic environment in which audits are
conducted. Some changes in standards
and procedures are made as a result of
new circumstances encountered. Other
changes in standards were adopted during
the 1988-89 year in response to our con
cerns and those expressed by the Securi
ties and Exchange Commission, the Gen
eral Accounting Office (GAO), the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting (Treadway Commission), and the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee
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on Energy and Commerce (Dingell
Committee):
■ As the result of a change in SEC
regulations, peer review teams are now
required to review initial audits performed
by the reviewed firms for SEC registrants
for which a "reportable event" was
reported in a Form 8K by the predecessor
auditor.
■ As the result of the GAO's adoption of
revised government auditing standards
which require firms that conduct specified
audits to meet minimum requirements,
peer review teams are now required to
review compliance with these standards.
■ As the result of a recommendation of the
Treadway Commission, peer review
standards now require review teams to
select for review those offices of the
reviewed firm that had performed the
greatest number of initial audits of public
companies, and to review at least one
such audit performed in each office visited.
■ As the result of a concern expressed by
the Dingell Committee that the SEC is not
being notified quickly enough of potential
problems, the Section now requires a
member to notify a former client in w rit
ing of termination of the auditor-client
relationship within five business days of
such termination and to send a copy of
such letter to the SEC Chief Accountant
at the same time. Peer review teams are
required to test compliance with this
requirement.
■ As the result of concerns expressed by

the POB and the SEC, review teams are
now required to test not only the com
pleteness but also the timeliness of re
porting litigation to the Quality Control
Inquiry Committee.
Improvements in Quality o f
Practice. The Board concurs with the
Section's conclusion that the peer review
process has improved the quality of audit
practice of member firms. These improve
ments are discussed at length in the ac
companying annual report of the Section.
Peer review is a vibrant and relevant
program that benefits both reviewed firms
and reviewers. As reported in an April 1989
Journal o f Accountancy article entitled "Les
sons Learned from Peer Review" coau
thored by our Technical Director, Charles J.
Evers, and PRC Chairman David B. Pearson,
all firms, even those that have been peer
reviewed several times, derive benefits
from each review.
A firm cannot become complacent as
a result of having received an unqualified
report on its peer review. Compliance with
quality control policies and procedures
must be emphasized continually and moni
tored carefully. Two firms apparently did
not heed such advice; the firms received
modified reports in 1988 after receiving
unqualified reports on their 1985 reviews.
Managements of member firms must be
committed to maintaining quality service,
communicating that commitment through
out the firm, and continuously monitoring
compliance with quality control policies
and procedures.
POB Chairman AI Sommer with
PRC members Harry DeVerter
and Tom Stemlar at
November 1, 1988 meeting.
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Oversight
o f the
Quality Control
Inquiry Process

The quality control inquiry process supple
ments the peer review process. It is admin
istered by the Quality Control Inquiry Com
mittee (QCIC), originally named the Special
Investigations Committee (SIC), which
reviews all litigation and government pro
ceedings that allege a firm did not perform
an audit of a publicly-held company in
accordance with professional standards. All
such litigation is required to be reported to
the QCIC by member firms. The QCIC's
task is to determine whether the allegations
indicate possible deficiencies in the firm's
quality controls.
Thus, the objectives of the peer review
and QCIC processes coincide. The QCIC
process supplements the peer review pro
cess by evaluating the allegations in con
tested audits and their implications. It
determines whether to review certain
aspects or operations of a firm's quality
control system not reviewed by the peer
review team, or in light of these allegations
to review in greater depth certain aspects
or operations that had recently been sub
jected to peer review.
In addition, the QCIC's job is to analyze
such litigation to determine whether profes
sional standards, quality control standards,
or the Section's membership requirements
need revision or whether additional guid
ance is needed.
Joint Meeting w ith the QCIC.
Last September, the Board met with the
full Quality Control Inquiry Committee to
exchange thoughts on the many thorny
issues relevant to the credibility and effec
tiveness of the QCIC process, focusing on
issues requiring decisions in the 1988-89
year. This joint meeting provided both the
Board and committee members with a
better understanding of the critical issues,
and generated ideas on how they might be
resolved in the best interests of the public
and the member firms. These issues and
proposed solutions are the subject matter
of the balance of this section.
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Change o f Committee Name.
During the year, the committee's name was
changed from the Special Investigations
Committee to the Quality Control Inquiry
Committee. The Board and others had
urged a name change for several years
because the former name was considered
misleading. An investigatory committee is
generally perceived as intended to pass
judgment on events and the responsibility
for them. That was never intended to be
the primary mission of this committee. Its
mission is and always has been to gain
assurance in the light of adverse allegations
whether a firm's quality control system is
adequate and being complied with. Hence,
the name, "Quality Control Inquiry Com
mittee," more appropriately describes this
mission.
Evaluation o f Actions Taken on
Individual Cases. The Board monitors
the activities of the QCIC and has unre
stricted access to the committee's files as
well as to all meetings of the committee
and its task forces. The Board's staff reads
the complaint, pertinent financial state
ments, other public documents, and rele
vant professional literature for each
reported case. During the 1988-89 year, all
QCIC meetings were attended by one or
more Board members and staff. Staff mem
bers, at times accompanied by a Board
member, also attended a substantial major
ity of the meetings during which QCIC task
forces and firm representatives discussed
the quality control implications of the alle
gations. Additionally, staff members
observed the performance of all special
reviews ordered by the committee. The
staff reviewed all workpapers documenting
the performance of the special review
teams and attended closing meetings
where the findings of the special reviews
were reported to management representa
tives of the firms reviewed. The results of
these monitoring procedures are reported
at each Board meeting.
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QCIC Chairman Bill Hall
and POB Chairman
A l Sommer.

Generally, the Board concurred with
decisions on individual cases made by the
committee during the year. In one instance
where a firm had conducted internal
reviews of other engagements performed
by the teams which had supervised alleg
edly faulty audits, the Board concluded that
the committee had not obtained sufficient
documented evidence that the firm had
implemented appropriate corrective action.
While the committee had received broad
oral assurance that needed actions had
been taken, the Board felt the public inter
est would be better served if the commit
tee obtained greater assurance by review
ing and testing the results obtained from
the firm's internal reviews. The committee
adopted the Board's recommendation and
ascertained the specific actions the firm
had taken.
Committee Communication w ith
Standard-Setting Bodies. The QCIC has
communicated, as appropriate, with the
Auditing Standards Board and the Account
ing Standards Executive Committee when
ever the committee concluded additional
guidance or clarification was needed con
cerning accounting or auditing issues iden
tified in reported cases. The Board com
mends the committee for these efforts.

Timeliness o f Reporting Cases. In
our last year's report, we noted that some
firms had not reported relevant litigation or
proceedings to the committee, as required,
within thirty days of filing or initiation. The
matter was brought to the attention of the
Executive Committee by the QCIC chair
man, and procedures were implemented
by the Section's staff to improve the timeli
ness of reporting. However, some instances
of late reporting were still observed. As a
consequence, tardiness in reporting cases
to the QCIC was included in a large firm's
peer review letter of comments, and the
Peer Review Committee revised review
procedures so that the reporting of cases to
the QCIC will be tested more extensively
by peer review teams. We strongly urge
member firms to develop, and enforce
compliance with, procedures to assure
timely reporting of cases to the QCIC so
the committee can address the quality
control implications of the allegations in a
timely manner.
Improving the Effectiveness o f
the Process. The Board continues to be
lieve that the quality control inquiry process
is effective and operated in the public inter
est. Improvements have been made in the
efficiency and effectiveness of the process
primarily through further implementation of
the recommendations of the Task Force on
SIC Methodology, which issued its report
in 1987.
The committee during the year refined
its inquiry process. In order to better serve
the public interest and increase the willing
ness of firms to cooperate with its requests,
the committee developed procedures that
permit discharge of its responsibilities while
protecting the rights of a firm not to preju
dice its defense in litigation. This requires a
delicate balance between aggressiveness
and restraint; the Board has suggested that
the committee, when faced with a difficult
decision, lean in the direction of serving the
public interest.

Public Oversight Board / 1 988-89 Annual Report

Committee procedures are uniformly
applied to cases in a positive, structured
manner. If analysis of the allegations of
audit failure are not considered frivolous,
the QCIC performs additional stipulated
procedures until it concludes that the firm's
quality controls and compliance therewith
are satisfactory. If such satisfaction is not
obtained through its inquiry and investiga
tive procedures, a special review is ordered
with a scope tailored by the results ob
tained from its prior procedures.
Approach to Special Reviews.
To further implement its recently adopted
structured approach, the QCIC drafted
guidelines for performing special reviews
and intends to order more special reviews
to be performed, particularly those focusing
on other audits supervised by the manage
ment team on the allegedly faulty audit.
The draft guidelines give the special
review team captain the option of using
personnel of the firm to be reviewed in a
review capacity. The committee believes,
and the Board concurs, that such reviews
may be more effective because of the inti
mate knowledge such personnel have of
the firm's quality control system, and
would have the concomitant benefit of
reducing the cost of special reviews.
The Board, however, believes that
personnel of the firm to be reviewed may
not be perceived as being sufficiently
objective to serve as members of special
review teams. The Board communicated its
views to the QCIC, recommending that, at a
minimum, no person be assigned to a spe
cial review team that is to review a part of
a firm's quality control system that such
person had recently opined on.
We commend the QCIC for its willing
ness to conduct more special reviews in
defined circumstances and for its concern
that member firms not be unduly burdened
by the cost of such reviews. We believe
that the above-described policy for appoint
ment of members to special review teams

will result in effective and cost-efficient
special reviews, and will enhance the pub
lic's perception of the objectivity and credi
bility of the process.
Possible SEC Endorsement o f the
QCIC Process. The Chief Accountant of
the SEC has indicated that he believes that,
whenever the allegations indicate that the
firm's quality control policies may not have
been complied with, the QCIC should re
quire that a review be conducted of other
engagements supervised by the profes
sionals involved in the allegedly failed audit.
In addition, he indicated that the format of
the closed case summary needed to be
expanded to include the bases for the
QCIC's various actions.
Members of the Chief Accountant's
staff met with our staff on several occa
sions in the 1988-89 year to review and
discuss cases on which the QCIC had con
cluded its inquiries. The SEC staff was
complimentary of QCIC efforts and of the
effectiveness of POB oversight, but con
cluded that the closed case summaries
provided did not include sufficient detail
about (a) the inquiries made by the QCIC,
(b) the results obtained from such inquiries,
and (c) the basis for actions taken.

POB-QCICjoint meeting on September 14, 1988.
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During the year, discussions were held
within the Section seeking to find a format
for the closed case summary that could
serve as a basis for satisfactory SEC moni
toring of QCIC activities without unduly
prejudicing the outcome of litigation. A task
force of Executive and QCIC members and
house counsels of member firms was ap
pointed to study this matter.
We believe that appropriate attention
is being given to securing full SEC endorse
ment of the process. Whether the closed
case summary can be as comprehensive as
the Chief Accountant would like without
significantly affecting the litigation risk of
firms is a question we cannot answer. Since
the Commission is a responsible federal

agency that appreciates the difficulties in
resolving the legal issues regarding SEC
access, the Board remains confident that
an accommodation can be reached where
by the SEC will be able to provide endorse
ment. We pledge ourselves to work closely
with the Section and the SEC to this end.
The Board must emphasize, however,
that SEC endorsement of the process will
not in itself make the process more effec
tive or more in the public interest. Given
the present quality of QCIC performance,
SEC endorsement of the process is sought
for only one reason—to enhance credibility
of the process to the public.

POB Chairman A l
Sommer, AICPA
Chairman Bob May,
and AICPA President
Phil Chenok with POB
Vice Chairman Bob
Mautz at meeting on
December 14, 1988.
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We have monitored the activities of the
Section's Executive and Planning Commit
tees and conclude the public interest and
the interest of member firms were reasonably
balanced in the setting of rules and member
ship requirements.
Extent o f QCIC Jurisdiction. On
September 1 , 1988, the Board wrote to the
Executive Committee expressing its con
cerns about an interpretation the commit
tee had given to paragraph six of the
QCIC's organizational document when it
decided not to grant the QCIC's request for
jurisdiction in a matter of litigation alleging
audit failure on a non-public company audit.
Paragraph six reads:
"The [QCIC] committee may identify a
significant public interest in an alleged
audit failure that is not required to be
reported to the committee. The execu
tive committee shall determine what
actions, if any, shall be taken by the
section with respect to such matters."
In its letter to the Executive Commit
tee, the Board indicated that it was more
concerned with the sharply divergent inter
pretations of the relevant paragraph by the
QCIC and the Executive Committee than
with the fact that the QCIC was not granted
jurisdiction over the case in question. Con
sequently, the Board urged that the widely
differing interpretations of the two commit
tees be resolved and the meaning of this
paragraph be clarified.
A task force of Executive and QCIC
members was formed for this purpose.
Soon after its formation, the task force was
asked to recommend how paragraph six
should be applied to the host of non-public
savings and loan institutions that had
recently become insolvent. As discussed
below, the major question was whether
the QCIC should be given jurisdiction over
lawsuits against accountants initiated by
federal agencies, such as the FDIC and
FSLIC, which litigation would not be report
able to the QCIC because the financial insti
tutions are not public entities as defined in
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the membership requirements.
Concern for the Public Interest in
S&L Cases. The task force recommended
and the Executive Committee adopted an
interpretation of paragraph six which con
cluded that (a) there is a significant public
interest in S&Ls and in financial institutions
in general, and (b) the QCIC should conduct
inquiries into all litigation initiated by federal
agencies such as the FDIC and FSLIC which
alleges failure in connection with the audits
of financial institutions. The intrepretation
does not impose a reporting obligation on
member firms. Instead, the QCIC, when it
becomes aware of the initiation of litigation
by a federal agency, will request the firm to
provide a copy of the complaint, which the
QCIC would screen to ascertain if it raises
quality control questions. If the complaint
raises such questions, the QCIC will seek
the firm's agreement for the QCIC to add
the case to its agenda and subject it to
standard inquiry procedures. If the firm
either refuses to provide the complaint or
objects to it being added to the QCIC's
agenda, the Executive Committee is to
decide the action to be taken.
The Board agrees that there is signifi
cant public interest in cases involving finan
cial institutions and that such cases merit,
at a minimum, the above-described QCIC
special procedures.
We expressed reservations about the
procedures in one respect. The QCIC has no
authority to become involved with allega
tions of audit failure unless litigation has
been initiated. It will not, for example, deal
with matters such as the six alleged audit
failures on bankrupt S&Ls reported by the
GAO unless they become the subject of
litigation. These six "cases" were officially
reported to the AICPA before litigation had
been initiated for some of them. The AICPA
referred them to its Professional Ethics
Division. This division traditionally deals
only with complaints against individuals
and only when litigation or threat of litiga
tion does not exist. We believe the quality
control implications of allegations of audit

20

failure against firms should be dealt with
by the Section regardless of whether
litigation is initiated.
We have asked the Executive Commit
tee to reconsider whether the quality con
trol implications of alleged audit failures by
member firms charged by a governmental
regulatory agency should be considered by
the QCIC.
In this regard, however, we commend
the profession for its performance as the
savings and loan crisis was unfolding. The
AICPA repeatedly refused to countenance
"make believe" accounting practices urged
by the regulatory authorities. Its sensitivity
and conduct were well stated in AICPA
President Philip B. Chenok's testimony
before the House Committee on Bank
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs in February
1989.
Lawsuits Involving O ther NonPublic Entities. With respect to the afore
mentioned task force's initial charge to
provide guidance on how "significant public
interest" in paragraph six of the QCIC's
organizational document should be inter
preted, the task force concluded there was
no need to issue additional guidance on the
meaning of the phrase. The Executive Com
mittee concurred, stating subsequent dis
cussions between representatives of the
two committees indicated that existing
materials were adequate and that the
determination of "significant public inter
est" could be made effectively on a caseby-case basis. The Board directed its staff
to monitor the Section's actions in dealing
with alleged audit failures by governmental
agencies of non-public companies that are
brought to the attention of the QCIC.
Concurring Partner Review
Requirement. The Board regards a preis
suance review of audits of public compa
nies as a key quality control procedure and
accordingly strongly endorses the Section's
concurring partner review requirement.
The Board recognizes that smaller
firms have difficulty in complying with this

strengthened requirement because they
may not have a qualified concurring
reviewer. Thus, they must look outside the
firm for help. In the current litigious environ
ment, outside reviewers are not easy to
find. Consequently, the Board urged the
Section to study ways in which the Section
could assist smaller firms in complying
with the requirement. This is especially
important if the AlCPA's proposal is
adopted that would require that CPAs in
firms with SEC clients be allowed to retain
individual membership in the AICPA only if
their firms are members of the Section. In
this regard, we have been informed that
the liability insurance policy issued under
the Institute's plan provides coverage for an
outside second reviewer if such review is
performed under a contractual relationship,
but only on a claims-made basis, which can
expose the reviewer to a significant liability
risk. Therefore, we urge the Section to ex
plore all possible ways to enable member
firms to make themselves available to other
member firms for such reviews without
unreasonable risk, and, when that is done,
to compile and make public a list of such
available reviewers.
D irect Communication w ith the
SEC on Termination o f Audit-Client
Relationship. We commend the Section
for the practical resolution of a difficult
problem, namely, keeping the SEC
informed when an audit firm becomes
aware that its audit relationship with an
SEC registrant has ended. The Section
adopted a new membership requirement
effective May 1, 1989, requiring member
firms to send the former client a letter
within five business days of becoming
aware of the termination of the audit client
relationship. The auditor is also required to
send a copy of such letter to the SEC Chief
Accountant to serve as notification that a
Form 8K should have been filed by the
registrant reporting the fact and circum
stances of a change in auditors.
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M andatory Quality Review. The
AICPA continues its efforts to expand the
scope of its self-regulatory program for
accounting firms. The coming year will
mark the commencement of a new quality
review program, adopted in 1988 by an
overwhelming vote of the AlCPA's individ
ual members. As a result, to qualify for
individual membership in the AICPA, a CPA
in public practice must be a member of a
firm whose quality control system is sub
jected periodically to either a peer review
or a quality review. As of June 3 0 , 1989,
39,300 firms had enrolled in the new quality
review program; an additional 4,700 firms
are members of either the SEC Practice
Section or the Private Companies Practice
Section, both of which have mandatory
peer review requirements. All members of
the accounting profession can take pride in
the scope and rigor of the profession's selfregulatory program, and the commitment
of so many of its members to the program.
The major differences between a
review under the new quality review (QR)
program and an SECPS peer review are:
SECPS peer review results are placed in a
public file while QR results are non-public;
SECPS peer reviews are subject to POB
oversight and peer reviews of firms that
audit SEC registrants may be selected for
review by the SEC; SECPS imposes rigor
ous additional requirements upon its mem
bers, such as mandatory rotation of the
partner-in-charge of audits of SEC regis
trants, mandatory preissuance review by
another partner of audits of SEC registrants,
proscription of specified consulting ser
vices, and mandatory reporting of informa
tion about consulting services performed
for SEC registrants to audit committees of
such registrants.
In a March 6 , 1989 report addressed to
Congressman Dingell's Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, the GAO
criticized the SEC for failure to adopt a rule
requiring auditors of SEC registrants to
undergo periodic peer reviews. The POB

has stated repeatedly that a firm auditing
one or more public companies should be
required to have its quality control system
periodically reviewed by a competent and
independent peer. Consequently, the Board
hopes that AICPA members will approve a
current proposal to strengthen the profes
sion's self-regulatory program. At its 1989
Spring Meeting, the AICPA Council
approved reballoting on the Anderson
Committee's recommendation that a CPA
with a firm auditing an SEC registrant be
denied individual AICPA membership if
such firm is not a member of the SEC Prac
tice Section. The Board urges all AICPA
members to cast an affirmative ballot when
the matter is voted on in the fall of 1989.
While the Board clearly prefers that matters
such as these be dealt with through selfregulatory processes, if the current effort to
secure AICPA membership approval of
mandatory membership in the SEC Practice
Section for firms auditing SEC registrants
fails, the Board will strongly urge the SEC
to adopt its proposal for mandatory peer
review as published in April 1987, hopefully
modified as the Board suggested in its
comments on the proposal.
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POB member Paul McCracken,
FDIC Chairman William Seidman,
and POB members M el Laird and
Bob Froehlke at POB meeting on
M ay 1, 1989.
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Conclusions
and
Commentary

The POB has never been in the direct
"chain of command" in the Section's selfregulatory program, and it has never indi
cated that this would be desirable. Our task
is to represent the public's interest in the
quality of independent auditing, and to
accomplish this oversight by overseeing
the activities of the accounting profes
sionals conducting the programs.
The activities of the Section are impor
tant components of the accounting profes
sion's self-regulatory program. Successful
operation of the program gives reasonable
assurance that its member firms meet pro
fessional standards for accounting and
auditing services, but it cannot guarantee
continuation of quality service.
Therefore, top managements of CPA
firms must continually emphasize that the
provision of high quality auditing services is
their primary objective. In this regard, we
believe the leaders of the profession face a
difficult and challenging task. The following
commentary identifies the bases for that
belief.
Professionalism. Public accounting
firms are undergoing organizational meta
morphoses and becoming involved in an
ever-expanding scope of services for
present and prospective clients. These
services provide obvious profit opportuni
ties for individual firms. While profits en
sure the ability of a firm to provide quality
audit services and enhance its ability to
attract top quality people to the firm, the
profit motive cannot be permitted to en
danger the "professionalism" of firms.
The maintenance of the traditional
concepts of professionalism, which em
body integrity, objectivity, and competence,
is essential. The profession at large and
individual firms must be constantly mindful
of the social importance of auditing and not
judge professional success solely in eco
nomic terms. Educators, providers of con
tinuing professional education programs,
and managements of CPA firms must con
tinually reaffirm the need to maintain the
credibility of the audit process.

Price Competition. The Board is
concerned that an excessive emphasis on
growth and profitability by public account
ing firms could result in a deemphasis of
the social responsibility of the independent
auditor. Moreover, intense price competi
tion for audit clients does damage to both
the public image and the self-image of the
auditor as an objective professional. Pricing
services at or below cost may be perceived
as "good business" for the purpose of ob
taining clients in industries in which a firm
has hitherto not been active. But if this
leads to cutting the price of audit services
as a regular practice to obtain new clients,
the possibility of deterioration in the quality
of the audit services then provided cannot
be overlooked. Low realization on new
clients can put a tremendous strain on the
engagement team servicing them. In time,
the initial rationale by firm management to
charge lower-than-normal fees may be
come obscured, resulting in pressures be
ing brought on the audit teams to increase
the "profitability" of services to the client.
In the worst case, this could result in inap
propriate shortcuts in performing required
audit procedures and a subsequent lower
ing of audit quality.
Profits in Perspective. Public ac
counting firms are changing. We see con
tinuing increases in the proportion of total
firm revenues provided by management
advisory services (MAS) and a decline in
the proportion provided by auditing. There
is nothing wrong with that, per se, but it
does raise a difficult question. Is there a
point at which total fees or total net income
derived from nonaudit services will lead to
decreased attention by top management to
the importance of audit professionalism?
Member firms are changing their char
acters in other ways. As their marketing
strategies are expanded with the acquisi
tion of other service organizations, public
accounting firms are accelerating their entry
into a variety of markets unrelated to ac
counting and auditing. It is not unusual to
see an increasing array of services that are

Public Oversight Board / 19 8 8-8 9 Annual Report

not derived from the firm's traditional ex
pertise in accounting, auditing, and tax
matters associated with the attest function.
It is not difficult to visualize the day when
independent auditing will be offered as but
one of the many services provided by firms
in a great variety of product and service
markets throughout the world, and it is not
difficult to argue that the importance of
auditing to firms and to the profession may
be diminished under such conditions with a
commensurate hazard to the quality of
auditing.
Our chairman, in his address to AICPA
Council last spring, commented on these
changes:
"There is an old golden rule, not the one
that we are familiar with, but the one
that says 'He who has the gold rules.'
As consulting services become a larger
part o f practices and contribute more to
profitability, / think there will be chal
lenges in firms to the leadership of
those who have the professional ded
ication that all o f you have to quality
auditing services.
That is a long-term problem. / think it
is one that the accounting profession
must be sensitive to and it must work
constantly to assure that there is no
diminution for any reason in the quality
o f audit services that are rendered to
the American public and abroad, too,
for that matter.
think it is a matter o f psychological
versus financial primacy. As more and
more firms expand much more quickly
their consulting practices than they do
their auditing practices, the financial
contributions that are made by the
non-auditing services will grow
proportionately."
/

Profits and growth are appropriate
business objectives and both are necessary
to the long-term viability of firms. There
fore, a greater sharing of management deci
sion-making powers with MAS and other
non-audit personnel is likely inevitable.
However, when pursuing "other" business

objectives, and to serve the public interest
well, public accounting firms must take
special care to remember that the audit of
a public company carries responsibilities
beyond those of any other service of the
firm. To serve the public well and to meet
these professional responsibilities, firms
auditing public companies must continually
emphasize the significance of their role as
independent auditors, and must continue
to take whatever steps are necessary to
assure that the quality of audit services will
not be diminished in any way.
Should the sensitivity of firms to the
unique responsibility and privilege placed
upon them as independent auditors be
diluted, the profession and the business
and financial community, as well as society
in general, will have lost. As our vice chair
man observed in his editorial referred to
previously:
"If CPAs ever forget or neglect their
responsibilities to society in audit prac
tice, or are perceived to have neglected
or forgotten that responsibility, that
practice may become restricted, regu
lated, or withdrawn from their exclusive
privilege by the society that granted it
and now feels itself ill-served."
Auditor Independence. A segment
of the public accounting profession is advo
cating the acceptability of a limited com
mercial community of interest with audit
clients, such as permitting an auditor to
enter into a contractor or subcontractor
relationship with an audit client to provide
services to a third party, when the fees
involved are deemed to be immaterial to
both parties. While there appears little dan
ger in the specific proposal at issue, it does
chip away ever so slightly at audit indepen
dence and one chip tends to beget another.
And if the concept of audit independence
erodes, it may be difficult to restore. Any
change in independence rules requires the
most careful consideration, because inde
pendence is the hallmark of the auditing
profession.

23

24

This matter is under consideration by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
We have urged the Commission to request
public comment to assist it in determining
whether the proposal at issue should be
favorably acted upon.

Regardless of the merits of the
charges, any suit results in considerable
cost and inconvenience. The AICPA ap
pointed a task force to develop means by
which the burden of litigation might be
reduced. We encourage that effort, and we
urge that the courts move more aggres
sively to dispose quickly of suits against
accountants that are clearly ill-founded.
However, it must be recognized that some
suits are meritorious, that accounting firms
do not and should not escape their respon
sibility to investors and creditors for the
quality of their work, and that inevitably
they will be held accountable for faulty
work. The possibility of civil litigation may
be an inducement for some firms to main
tain and strengthen the quality of their au
dit activity. However, it is clear that the
courts have not yet developed sufficient
procedures to separate out those suits
without reasonable foundation from those
having such a basis.

Litigation Alleging A udit Failure.
The accounting profession continues to be
the target of lawsuits claiming enormous
damages for allegedly faulty audits. The
Board's oversight activity with respect to
the Quality Control Inquiry Committee en
tails a review of all the complaints that are
filed against member firms alleging faulty
audits of publicly-held companies. This
review indicates that in many cases audit
ing firms are charged with derelictions
when they clearly should not be. Further,
while many cases charge some involve
ment of the auditor in faulty financial re
porting, it is clear the main responsibility is
not the auditor's.
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SEC Chief Accountant and QCIC Representatives
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PRC Meeting

PRC Representatives

Peer Review Exit Conference

A U GUST
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QCIC Meeting

Address by POB Vice Chairman to Utah Association
of CPAs

QCIC Task Force Meeting
PRC Meeting
Planning Committee Meeting

Executive Committee Meeting

POB Meeting

PRC Meeting

QCIC Representatives
QCIC Meeting
Executive Committee Meeting
Peer Review Exit Conference
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Planning Committee Meeting

POB Meeting
AICPA Officers
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Every major financial settlement and
every decision against a public accounting
firm for investor compensation, justified or
not, makes the profession less attractive to
students as well as to practitioners. Fortu
nately for them, those now active in the
profession and those preparing for it are
also well qualified for alternative careers.
Unfortunately for the public, their shifting
to other careers will lessen rather than
maintain the present quality of auditing
services.

this settlement. However, it is concerned
with suggestions made by FTC staff that,
in the interests of expanding competition,
there should be no barriers against owner
ship of accounting firms by outside inves
tors.
Similar suggestions have been made
in the United Kingdom and in the European
Economic Community. The Board believes
these proposals are an invitation to disaster.
Outside investors in accounting firms
would have only one objective, the maximi
zation of profit, and they would not be likely
to have as healthy a concern for profession
alism and adherence to professional stand
ards in the conduct of audits.
We would hope that governmental
authorities and agencies in this country and
elsewhere will realize that the public is illserved by such changes, ostensibly to stim
ulate competition, that could erode profes
sional commitments and standards. We are

Regulatory Measures A ffecting
Professionalism. A settlement agree
ment between the Federal Trade Commis
sion and the AICPA is pending, under
which the Institute will remove from its
rules the ban on members engaging in
certain activities on a contingent fee or
commission basis for non-attest clients.
The Board does not at this time wish to
comment on the wisdom or desirability of
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Executive Committee Meeting
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pleased th a t there have been so m e in d ica 

applicable, d ire cte d at m a in ta in in g th e q u a l

tio n s b y m e m b e rs o f th e Federal Trade

ity o f th e s e lf-re g u la to ry pro g ra m s o f th e

C o m m issio n o f s e n s itiv ity to these

profession. In disch a rg in g o u r ove rsig h t

concerns.

Mergers o f Larger CPA Firms. In
recent m o n th s, six o f th e so-called "B ig
E ig h t" a cco u n tin g firm s have e ith e r m erged

responsibility, w e m u s t assure th e pu b lic
th a t th e q u a lity o f a u d itin g p e rfo rm e d by
these firm s is n o t adve rse ly affected.

The Role o f Auditing. O ur c o m p le x

o r anno u n ce d th a t th e y are con sid e rin g

e c o n o m y d e m a n d s reliable financial data as

m erger. T he im p lica tio n s o f these events,

a basis fo r th e allocation o f credit, capital,

b o th in th is c o u n try and th ro u g h o u t th e

and resources in general. A n indispen sable

w o rld , are n o t y e t clear. T he im p a c t these

re q u ire m e n t fo r th e e ffe c tiv e fu n c tio n in g o f

m ergers m a y have upo n th e a c tiv itie s o f

o u r liberal, m arket-organize d, cap ita listic

th e SEC Practice S ection is n o w being s tu d 

e c o n o m y is accurate, d e p e n d a b le aud ite d

ied. Since th e b e g in n in g o f th e program ,

financial in fo rm a tio n a b o u t th e results o f a

these large firm s have ty p ic a lly engaged a

c o m p a n y 's operation s. Thus, th e in d e p e n 

sim ila r firm to c o n d u c t th e ir peer review s.

d e n t a u d ito r plays an a b s o lu te ly necessary

S o m e o f these firm s, fo r various reasons,

role fo r th e successful op e ra tio n o f o u r

have n o t co n d u c te d peer review s. Hence,

c a p ita listic econom y. T he p u b lic interest

a tte n tio n m u s t be given to th e c o n tin u in g

and th e inte re st o f c lie n t m a n a g e m e n ts w ill

a va ila b ility o f large firm s capable o f re v ie w 

n o t be w e ll served if th e q u a lity o f a u d itin g

ing, and being w illin g to review , o th e r large

services declines.

firm s.
T hese m ergers should n o t per se result

S o c ie ty has g ra n te d c e rtifie d p ublic
a c c o u n ta n ts an exclusive franchise to a u d it

in a d im in u tio n o f q u a lity a u d itin g b y th e

financial s ta te m e n ts and has a llo w e d the

resulting firm s. H ow ever, so m e o f th e te n 

profession, in large m easure, to set and

dencies and tre n d s discussed above m ay

enforce its standards. T h e profession's

be acce n tu a te d b y th e m . W e in te n d to

s ta n d a rd -s e ttin g and s e lf-re g u la to ry a c tiv i

m o n ito r clo se ly th e consequ ences o f these

tie s are w o rk in g and o b v ia te th e need fo r

m ergers and m ake re c o m m e n d a tio n s , as
POB meeting w ith PRC representatives on November 1, 1988.
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public sector legislation and regulatory
initiatives. In a real sense, self-regulation
benefits society by providing a relatively
cost-free control system over activities that
could not be controlled as effectively in any
other way.
Therefore, loss of auditor indepen
dence, or even a perception of a lessening
of auditor independence, are problems to
which the profession must be sensitive.
We find no evidence that there has
been any deterioration in the quality of
independent audit services in this country.
At the same time, we cannot deny or ig
nore the potential for deterioration in the
trends discussed.
For that reason, those involved in the
self-regulatory components of the account
ing profession's program must not become
complacent about the program's success.
A soundly conceived, thoroughly sup
ported, and ever vigilant self-regulatory
system is essential to provide the investing
public with the quality of service it needs,
expects, and demands.
We urge the present leaders of the
profession to continue the fine tradition set
by their predecessors in utilizing the selfregulatory program to improve the quality
of auditing practice in the United States
and thus to contribute to the public good.
Finally, a personal note. Because of
his retirement, this is the last report of the
Public Oversight Board with which Louis
W. Matusiak will be associated. Lou capped
his long and varied career in accounting
with eleven years of service as the first
Executive Director of the Public Oversight
Board. He is the one who, writing on a
clean slate and with no precedents to fol
low, devised, developed, and directed our
oversight programs, and helped develop
the role of the Board and the manner in
which it interacts with the SEC Practice
Section and the relevant divisions of the

AICPA. He has indeed been a pioneer and a
seminal thinker, and it is no exaggeration to
say that without him the peer review and
QCIC programs would not have been the
successes they have been.
We salute Lou; we will miss him; we
will benefit in the years to come from the
tradition of excellence and dedication
which he established; and we hope we
may continue to call upon him for guidance
and wisdom in the acquitance of our duties.
One of the legacies Lou is leaving us is
a remarkably dedicated and competent
staff. He has brought aboard only the best:
our Technical Director Chuck Evers, our two
Assistant Technical Directors Alan Feldman
and John Cullen—all professionals in the
truest sense. We express our admiration of
them, we salute them, and in doing so we
express our gratitude to Lou for them.
Looking to the future, we are enor
mously pleased that Jerry D. Sullivan,
recently chairman of the Auditing Standards
Board as it developed the most important
"expectation gap standards" and a partner
of Coopers & Lybrand, has agreed to
become the executive director of the Board.
Jerry is an outstanding professional who
will, we are sure, continue the standards of
competence and professionalism estab
lished by Lou Matusiak.
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